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HOW TAX COMPETITION MAY BE
EXACERBATING INEQUALITIES AMONG
WASHINGTON COUNTIES
FABIO AMBROSIO1
Tax and criminological research often converge on mutual
socioeconomic observations, such as the demographic makeup of a given
jurisdiction, its income distribution, educational attainment, rate of
unemployment, or levels of poverty. This heightened attention to social
predictors of revenue and crime is a recent development that started with the
urbanization trend of the last one hundred years. In fact, social
interdependence and awareness has become drastically more prominent this
past century with the exponential growth of urbanization. While only 40% of
the American population lived in urban areas at the turn of the 19th century,
that percentage nearly doubled to 79% by the turn of the 20th century and is
predicted to grow to almost 90% by 2050.2
The urbanization trend has increased the density of social networks,
including the intertwining of behavioral and policy phenomena that before
the 19th century were thought to be independent of each other. For example,
early criminological research viewed crime as the expression of something
wrong with the individual committing the crime, such as sub-standard
intelligence, psychic forces, biological imperfections, or “criminal bumps”

1

Fabio Ambrosio, J.D., LL.M., M.B.A., C.P.A./P.F.S./A.B.V., C.F.P., E.A.,
C.V.A., M.A.F.F., C.F.E., C.G.M.A, is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at
Central Washington University. Besides being an attorney and CPA, he is also a
trained mediator and a recipient of a Fulbright grant in taxation. Fabio is a recurring
visiting professor at Swiss and Chinese universities and serves as adjunct
disciplinary counsel for the Washington State Bar Association. He is the author of
the book Principles of Taxation in the United States: Theory, Policy, and Practice,
and has published articles in the Journal of Tax Practice and Procedure, The Tax
Development Journal, The CPA Journal, The Journal of Financial Planning, and The
Value Examiner. Prior to joining academia, Fabio was an Appeals Officer in the
estate and gift tax program at the Internal Revenue Service.
2
Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, Urbanization, OUR WORLD IN DATA, (Sept.
2018), https://ourworldindata.org/urbanization#citation.
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on the head.3 Only in more recent times the research focus has shifted to
society as the possible explanation for criminal behavior.
Crime is but one of the phenomena that was previously thought to
depend solely on the individual and was recently rediscovered as fitting in a
greater social science. Urbanization has also changed the way researchers
study law, economics, epidemiology, ecology, anthropology, and many other
disciplines embedded in the relationship between people and their ecosystem.
For example, the urbanization phenomenon has deeply impacted the United
States geopolitically and fiscally. From a tax perspective, the jurisdictional
overlap and tangency of the American federal system, coupled with the
urbanization trend, has created unique layers of vertical and horizontal tax
competition.4 There is horizontal tax competition where two jurisdictions
vertically equivalent, such as two counties, compete for the same revenue.
There is vertical tax competition where two jurisdictions not vertically
equivalent, such as the state and a county within the state, compete for the
apportionment of tax revenue.5
Competition can be viewed as the intersect between tax and
criminological research. Whether the context is tax or crime, competition
refers to the same concept: the unequitable partition of a finite amount of
resources. In both bodies of literature, this unequitable distribution, often
associated with an obsessive culture of success and pursuit of the American
dream, leads to the disorganization of social structure, the disruption of
family values, and the stratification of social classes based on wealth.
Criminological literature has repeatedly explained crime through measures

3

AUGUST AICHHORN, Verwahrloster Jugend Wien: Internationaler
Psychoanalytischer Verlag [WAYWARD YOUTH OF VIENNA] (1925); ROBERT L.
DUGDALE, THE JUKES: A STUDY IN CRIME, PAUPERISM, AND HEREDITY, (G.P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1877); HENRY H. GODDARD, FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS: ITS CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES (MacMillan Co., 1914); GINA LOMBROSO, CRIMINAL MAN,
ACCORDING TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF CESARE LOMBROSO, (G.P. Putnam's Sons,
1911).
4
Michael Devereux et al., Horizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition:
Theory and Some Evidence From the USA, 91 J. OF PUB. ECON. 451 (2007).
5
Cynthia L. Rogers, Local Option Sales Tax (LOST) Policy on the Urban
Fringe, 34 J. REG’L ANALYSIS & POL’Y 27 (2004); John D. Wong, The Impact of
Local Option Sales Taxes on Retail Sales, Employment, Payrolls, and
Establishments: The Case for Kansas, 26 REV. REG’L STUD. 165 (1996); Zhirong
Zhao, Motivations, Obstacles, and Resources: The Adoption of the GeneralPurpose Local Option Sales Tax in Georgia Counties, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 721
(2005).
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of inequality in income, wealth distribution, educational attainment,
unemployment, and opportunities. By exacerbating inequalities across
jurisdictions, tax competition may be laying the foundations for more crime.

I.

CRIMINOLOGICAL LITERATURE

There is an ample body of empirical criminological research from
the last century that has looked at the statistical relationship between crime
and variables predicting crime. The early trend at the turn of the 19th century
was to explain crime through factors wholly within the individual.6 The
urbanization trend at the turn of the century caused a major change in
criminological research, shifting the focus of crime predictors toward social
indicators of crime outside the control of the individual. Unlike the early
research, modern studies formulate numerous theories of crime predictions,
which, albeit different, are all embedded in the greater social context.
One of the first researchers to formulate a socially induced crime
theory was Robert Merton, often seen as the father of social anomie theory.7
In general terms, the theory of social anomie suggests that an excessively
competitive society may lead to the disintegration of ethical behavior due to
the struggle for survival of the fittest. Merton argued that the rigid conformity
with traditional American values of economic success created a fictitious
picture where everyone, through hard work, could achieve the American
dream.8 This cultural indoctrination of obsessive economic success
inevitably emarginated those not able to achieve the American dream through
legitimate means. Therefore, Merton argued, it was the exaltation of
“success-seeking” that explained crime.9 In the theory of social anomie,
“anomie” is the result of the weakening of ethical behavior as society places
the largest emphasis on whether success is achieved, more so than how.
Social anomie theory rests on the premise that something is fundamentally
broken in the social structure, or its priorities, which fosters deviant
behavior.10 In this respect, social anomie theory also implies that economic
6

AICHHORN, supra note 3; DUGDALE, supra note 3; GODDARD, supra note 3;
LOMBROSO, supra note 3.
7
Robert Merton, Social Structure and Anomie, 3 AM. SOCIO. REV. 672 (1938).
8
Merton, supra note 7.
9
Id.
10
Mitchell B. Chamlin & John K. Cochran, Assessing Messner and
Rosenfeld's Institutional Anomie Theory: A Partial Test, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 411
(1995); Merton, supra note 7; Jukka Savolainen, Inequality, Welfare State, and
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safety nets may mitigate the incidence of some types of crime, as they reduce
social stress.11
Before moving on to other emerging criminological theories, the
meta-analysis of one hundred years of criminological research offers
valuable insights into how social trends shaped the research approach. The
early individualistic studies of Dugdale, Goddard, and others were followed
by a more complex and urbanized world, which increased awareness of
intricate social dynamics potentially leading to crime. The theory of social
anomie picked up on these dynamics during five decades of immense social
strain caused by two world wars and the Great Depression. These were major
events that, at least with respect to criminological literature, promoted a more
liberal and collective agenda.12 Not surprisingly, social anomie theory came
under attack in the 1970’s, when the American dream and economic success
were once again at the forefront of self-identification and anomie theory was
viewed as promoting a social agenda.13 In the last 50 years, two new theories
have emerged—social disorganization theory and deprivation theory—that
continue to find crime predictors in the greater social context but do not call
into question the very essence of American culture: economic success and
the American dream.
The theory of social disorganization rests on the statistical
relationship between crime and social disorder indicators, such as increased
urbanization, longer commute time, higher population density, and sparse
friendship networks.14 Shaw and McKay first formulated the theory when
Homicide: Further Support for the Institutional Anomie Theory, 38 CRIMINOLOGY
1021 (2000).
11
James DeFronzo, Economic Assistance to Impoverished Americans:
Relationship to Incidence of Crime, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 119 (1983).
12
Travis C. Pratt, Assessing the Relative Effects of Macro-level Predictors of
Crime: A Meta-Analysis, (Jan. 19, 2001) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Cincinnati) (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing).
13
STEVEN F. MESSNER & RICHARD ROSENFELD, CRIME AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997).
14
Paul E. Bellair, Social Interaction and Community Crime: Examining the
Importance of Neighbor Networks, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 677 (1977); Robert J. Bursik
Jr., Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency: Problems and
Prospects, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 519 (1988); Robert Sampson & Byron W. Groves,
Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J.
SOCIO. 774 (1989); CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS (University of Chicago Press 1972); Ralph B.
Taylor, Social Order and Disorder of Street Blocks and Neighborhoods: Ecology,
Microecology, and the Systemic model of Social Disorganization, 35 J. RSCH. IN
CRIME & DELINQ 113 (1997).
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they studied juvenile crime across Chicago neighborhoods and found that
crime was more prevalent in certain neighborhoods.15 They found that these
neighborhoods were “socially disorganized” in the sense that they had weak
social institutions—churches, schools, and adolescence organizations—
unable to adequately supervise the youth.16 Research in traditional social
disorganization theory looks at residential mobility, racial heterogeneity,
strengths of social associations and networks, and socioeconomic status: all
indicators at the neighborhood level. A more focused and recent approach to
the theory of social disorganization has noted that traditional social
disorganization theory has failed to consider the structure of the family as
predictive of that of the neighborhood.17 In this respect, measures of family
disruption such as divorce, single parenthood, the strength of the family
network, and time invested in raising children offer additional indicators of
social disruption at the micro family level.18
Deprivation theory suggests that crime is linked to indicators of
economic deprivation, where the general lack of means leads to higher
crime.19 For example, multiple studies have found a significant positive
relationship between unemployment rates and property crime, or poverty and
crime at large.20 Under the theory of deprivation, the business and economic
cycles are useful predictors of crime.21 The theory of deprivation, however,
does not only take an absolute form—whether poverty or unemployment is
present—but also a relative form. In its relative form, deprivation theory
15

SHAW & MCKAY, supra note 14.
Id.
17
ROBERT J. SAMPSON, Neighborhood Family Structure and the Risk of
Personal Victimization, in THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF CRIME 25 (Springer, 1986).
18
SAMPSON, supra note 17; Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson, Social
Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach, 44 AM. SOCIO. REV.
588 (1979); Nigel Barber, Single Parenthood as a Predictor of Cross-National
Variation in Violent Crime, 38 CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH 343 (2004).
19
J. ROBERT LILLY et al., CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: CONTEXT AND
CONSEQUENCES (Sage Publications, Inc. 2d ed., 1995); AUSTIN T. TURK,
CRIMINALITY AND THE LEGAL ORDER (Rand McNally, 1969).
20
Marvin D. Krohn, Inequality, Unemployment and Crime: A Cross-National
Analysis, 17 SOCIO. Q. 303 (1976); E. Britt Patterson, Poverty, Income Inequality,
and Community Crime Rates, 29 CRIMINOLOGY, 755 (1991); Ruth D. Peterson &
William C. Bailey, Forcible Rape, Poverty, and Economic Inequality in U.S.
Metropolitan Communities, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 99 (1988); Steven
Raphael & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on
Crime, 44 J. L. &. ECON. 259 (2001).
21
Albert C. Wagner, Crime and Economic Change in Philadelphia, 27 J.
CRIMINAL L. & CRIMINOLOGY 83 (1936).
16
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looks at inequality and wealth distribution rather than poverty or
unemployment.22 Relative deprivation research has found that economic
inequality is positively associated with crime, thus suggesting that income
redistribution may be a more effective measure of crime intervention than
punishment.23 Deprivation theory can be viewed as a growth form of social
anomie theory in that both study the social stress between those who have
and those who do not as predictors of crime. Unlike social anomie theory,
deprivation theory does not blame a broken success-hungry society, but
merely suggests that the satisfaction of basic needs and avoidance of
excessive social stratification of classes may be sufficient to curb criminal
behavior without redesigning the very essence of the American culture driven
by seeking economic success.
Theories of crime prediction are naturally interwoven. For example,
an increased divorce rate, coupled with both parents being fully employed,
would
suggest
lower
property crime rates as
deprivation decreases, but
higher non-property crime
Crime
rates because of family
Demographics (DG)
disruption
and
social
24
disorganization. None of
the theories claim to offer
Social
Absolute/Relative
Disorganization
Deprivation (ARD)
infallible forecasts but a
(SD)
meta-analysis
of
all
criminological
research
Family Disruption (FD)
shapes four key paradigms
of the strongest and most
stable predictors of crime:
22

Judith R. Blau & Peter M. Blau, The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan
Structure and Violent Crime. 47 AM. SOCIO. REV. 114 (1982).
23
Leo Carroll & Pamela I. Jackson, Inequality, Opportunity, and Crime Rates
in Central Cities. 21 CRIMINOLOGY 178 (1983); Sheldon Danziger & David
Wheeler, The Economics of Crime: Punishment or Income Redistribution, 33 REV.
SOC. ECON. 113, (1975); Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521 (1973); Lynne M.
Vieraitis, Inequality and Urban Crime: Labor Stratification, Income Inequality,
Poverty, and Violent Crime in Large United States Cities, 1990. (Oct. 4, 1999)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University) (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing).
24
Robert J. Sampson, Urban Black Violence: The Effect of Male Joblessness
and Family Disruption, 93 AM. J. SOCIO. 348 (1987).
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1.
Indicators of social disorganization (SD);
2.
Indicators of family disruption (FD);
3.
Indicators of absolute or relative deprivation (ARD);
4.
Demographics (DG). 25
Criminological literature offers three further lessons that are
important. First, policing and arrest measures are among the weakest
indicators of crime as they predict the use of public resources in fighting
crime but not the crime itself.26 Therefore, data pertaining to the size of the
police force per capita or the number of arrests is not useful to a study that
aims to gauge future crime trends.
Second, the value of the indicators of crime is in its degree of change
over time. For example, a 1993 study looked at whether an abrupt change in
a crime indicator is itself a crime predictor.27 The study looked at 500
delinquents and 500 control subjects matched by age, IQ, and
neighborhood.28 The study then gathered exhaustive records on the subjects’
life course and identified several life-turning points on a common scale.29
The study found that adult crime is clearly connected to childhood behavior,
but perhaps more so because it could lead to weaker adult social bonds (e.g.,
labor force attachment and marital cohesion), which are mitigative of crime.30
Thus, the benefits of a longitudinal study are evident in its ability to, among
other things, capture the predictive value of change.
Third, crime is often spatially autocorrelated and this autocorrelation
principle, coupled with longitudinal data and spatial association, dramatically
improves the predictable power of a statistical model.31 This is, in fact, the

25

Amy E. Nivette, Cross-National Predictors of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 15
HOMICIDE STUD. 103 (2011); Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing
Macro-Level Predictors and Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME &
JUST. 373 (2005).
26
Pratt & Cullen, supra note 25.
27
John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Turning Points in the Life Course: Why
Change Matters to the Study of Crime, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 301 (1993).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 305.
30
Id. at 306.
31
THE HANDBOOK OF MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (Beth M. Huebner ed. & Timothy S. Bynum ed., Wiley) (2016); NED
LEVINE, Spatial Autocorrelation Statistics, in CRIMESTAT IV: A SPATIAL
STATISTICS PROGRAM FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CRIME INCIDENT LOCATIONS,
VERSION 4.0, NAT. INST. JUST. (2013).
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very principle behind the crime prediction CrimeStat software, developed
under the direction of the United States Department of Justice.32

II.

TAX LITERATURE

A 1989 study found that the package of public services provided by
local governments is relatively standardized across localities; however, the
way local governments finance those public services is quite diverse.33 After
all, most cities must offer the same set of housekeeping functions: what will
vary is the quality of the services and thus the tax price. When it comes to
financing local public services, many studies have examined the optimal
revenue portfolio composition for local governments.34
Historically, the property tax has been the most important source of
local government revenue in the United States. Since the Reagan
administration, public support for the property tax has dramatically
decreased. While in 1970 property taxes contributed 84% of all local
government tax collections, the property tax share fell to 32% by 1994 and
down to 26.6% by 2015.35 This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the
“property tax revolt.” The property tax revolt forced local governments to
provide social services without relying too heavily on property taxes, as they
once did. In the last five decades, local governments have struggled to make
up for the lost property tax revenue through other revenue sources, such as
fines, licensing fees, utility taxes, documentary fees, bonds, and sales taxes.36
32

CrimeStat: Spatial Statistics Program for the Analysis of Crime Incident
Locations. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (2011),
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/crimestat-spatial-statistics-program-analysiscrime-incident-locations.
33
Mark Schneider, Fragmentation and the Growth of Local Government, 48
PUB. CHOICE. 255, 264 (1989).
34
David S. Jones & Maureen M. McIntosh, Revenue Options for Georgia
Localities, 6 GA. GOV’T REV. 6, (1974); Ben Lockwood, Commodity Tax
Competition and Tax Coordination under Destination and Origin Principles (Ctr.
for Econ. Policy Research, Paper No. 2256, 2000); Zhirong Jerry Zhao &
Changhoon Jung, Does Earmarked Revenue Provide Property Tax Relief? LongTerm Budgetary Effects of Georgia’s Local Option Sales Tax, 28 PUB. BUDGETING
& FIN. 52 (2008).
35
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CRITICAL ISSUES IN STATELOCAL FISCAL POLICY: A GUIDE TO LOCAL OPTION TAXES (Scott R. MacKey ed.,
1997); U.S. DEP’T COM., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/
(2015).
36
INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T, UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF COUNTY AND
CITY REVENUES (2013).
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The sales tax has become increasingly popular after the property tax
revolt for two main reasons. First, the sales tax has a low degree of salience,37
which makes it politically more acceptable than the property or income tax.38
Under the theory of tax salience, “salience” represents the degree of
consumer response to a tax change for reasons other than the net tax liability,
such as the way that taxes are displayed and the tax payment mechanism.
Therefore, an invisible tax, such as a sales tax added at the register, has low
salience and may not impact consumer behavior as much as expected based
on the sales tax rate.39 Southern states, such as Tennessee, North Carolina,
and Georgia, have spearheaded the effort to restructure local public financing
relying less on property tax revenue and more on sales tax revenue. Nearly
all the research concerning local sales tax policy to date, in fact, has been
geographically specific to these states.40
Second, the sales tax allows a jurisdiction to shift the cost incidence
of critical social services to residents of neighboring jurisdictions and
research has shown that taxpayers favor proposals that shift the tax incidence
to someone else.41 This trend promotes horizontal tax competition.42
Horizontal tax competition can be one of necessity, where residents of
neighboring jurisdictions are forced to commute to shop or find work in
another jurisdiction. It could also be a perfect competition where a
jurisdiction allures business and shopping through lower sales tax rates. In
both cases, the result is a tax spillover, a phenomenon where a jurisdiction
37

Raj Chetty et. al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM.
ECON. REV. 1145 (2009); Darien Shanske & David Gamage, Three Essays on Tax
Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19 (2011).
38
J. Biegelson & David Sjoquist, Rational Voting Applies to Choice of Taxes,
57 PUB. CHOICE 39 (1988); Andrew D. Green, Life in the Fast Lane:
Transportation Finance and the Local Option Sales Tax, 38 ST. LOC. GOV’T. REV.
92 (2006).
39
Chetty et al., supra note 37; Gamage, supra note 37.
40
Anicca C. Jansen, Can Sales Tax Revenue Equitable Finance Education?,
16 J. EDUC. FIN. 478 (1991); Jones, supra note 34; Ross Rubenstein & Catherine
Freeman, Do Local Sales Taxes for Education Increase Inequities? The Case of
Georgia’s ESPLOST, 28 J. EDUC. FIN. 425 (2003); Wen Wang & Zhirong Jerry
Zhao, Fiscal Effects of Local Option Sales Tax on School Facilities Funding:
Evidence from North Carolina, 23 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT., FIN., MGMT. 507
(2011); Zhao & Jung, supra note 34; Zhirong Jerry Zhao, Motivations, Obstacles,
and Resources: The Adoption Of the General-Purpose Local Option Sales Tax in
Georgia Counties, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 721 (2005).
41
Biegeleisen & Sjoquist., supra note 38.
42
Gregory Burge & Brian Piper, Strategic Fiscal Interdependence: County
and Municipal Adoptions of Local Option Sales Tax, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 387 (2012).
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collects an amount of sales tax different from the product of the sales tax rate
and the income spent by its residents.43 The overall result is an uneven flow
of tax revenue due to the spatial mobility of the revenue base. Tax spillovers
preclude an equity condition known as “fiscal equivalence.”44 Fiscal
equivalence would be present if a body of taxpayers paying for a public
service is 100% congruent with the body of taxpayers benefitting from that
public service. Fiscal equivalence, tax spillovers, and mitigation mechanisms
are key elements to the theory of tax competition.
At the local government level, sales taxes often take the form of
Local Option Sales Taxes (LOST).45 LOST consist of optional local increases
to the statewide sales tax rate. The increase is optional because localities can
choose whether to impose it and at what rate (within the rate limits authorized
by a state). LOST are generally levied towards a local general fund, but can
be levied to finance specific purposes, such as education or transportation, in
which case they are commonly referred to as “Special Purpose” Local Option
Sales Taxes (SPLOST). For example, Tennessee,46 North Carolina,47 and
Georgia48 have tried to finance public schools through a special local sales
tax surcharge imposed by the counties. Similarly, California tried to finance
public roads.49 Generally, studies have found that SPLOST are a suboptimal
method of financing critical government services because sales tax revenue
flows unevenly: since the revenue base (economic spending) is mobile, sales
tax revenue tends to flow where most shopping opportunities exist.50 While
the uneven flow could be mitigated through revenue-sharing at the state level,
state tax laws rarely mandate revenue sharing of local sales tax revenue. Not
surprisingly, research has shown that SPLOST tied to education and

43

Gregory Burge & Cynthia Rogers, Local option sales taxes and consumer
spending patterns: Fiscal interdependence under multi-tiered local taxation, 41
REGIONAL SCI. URB. ECON. 46 (2010).
44
Jansen, supra note 40; Lockwood, supra note 34.
45
Ronald J. Shadbegian, The Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations on the
Revenue Structure of Local Government, 1962-87, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 221 (1999);
Zhao, supra note 40.
46
TENN. CODE ANN. §67-6-701 (2020).
47
N.C. GEN. STAT. §105-463 (2020).
48
GA. CODE ANN. §48-8-111 (2020).
49
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §132300 (2020).
50
Burge & Rogers, supra note 43.
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transportation exacerbate inequalities among counties to the detriment of
rural communities.51
Local option sales tax literature has examined the interjurisdictional
tax competition whereby an increase in sales tax rates in one local jurisdiction
causes consumers to spend more in neighboring lower tax jurisdictions.52 The
results were confirmed by a 2010 study which found that LOST rates are
inversely and significantly related to retail sales and that higher sales tax rates
in rural communities accompany a disproportionally high erosion of retail
sales.53 From these studies we learn that market dominant, densely populated
jurisdictions surrounded by rural jurisdictions are best suited to export the tax
cost of their social services.
Most of the literature to date has focused on generic LOST policy
without distinction as to what social services the imported LOST revenue is
used to finance. In the context of SPLOST, the limited literature available
has focused on the correlation between SPLOST and public education
financing54 or public transportation financing.55 One of these studies
examined the correlation between LOST rates and local public education
financing in Tennessee.56The Tennessee study found that sales tax revenue
and capacity was particularly low in rural counties, which were in turn unable
to properly fund education.57 Another SPLOST study specific to public
education in North Carolina confirmed that the adoption of an education
SPLOST was aggravating inequalities across public schools within the state,
recommending that the central state government adopt a sales tax revenue

51

Green, supra note 38; Jansen supra note 40; Gary L. Peevely & John R.
Ray, Equity As Determined By Locally Funded Teaching Positions in Tennessee
Schools, 15 J. EDUC. FIN. 289 (1989); Rubenstein & Freeman, supra note 40;
Catherine Sielke, Rural Factors in State Funding Systems, 29 J. EDUC. FIN. 223
(2004).
52
Cynthia L. Rogers, Local Option Sales Tax (LOST) Policy on the Urban
Fringe, 34 J. REG’L ANALYSIS POL’Y. 27 (2004); John D. Wong, The Impact of
Local Option Sales Taxes on Retail Sales, Employment, Payrolls, and
Establishments: The Case for Kansas, 26 REV. REG’L STUD. 165 (1996); Zhao,
supra note 40.
53
Burge & Rogers, supra note 43.
54
Peevely & Ray, supra note 51; Jansen, supra note 40; Rubenstein &
Freeman, supra note 40; Sielke, supra note 51; Wen Wang & Zhirong Jerry Zhao,
Fiscal Effects of Local Option Sales Tax on School Facilities Funding: Evidence
from North Carolina, 23 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 507 (2011).
55
Green, supra note 38.
56
Jansen, supra note 40.
57
Id.
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sharing scheme across the state in order to mitigate tax spillovers.58 Every
other study reached similar conclusions: funding local services through sales
tax revenue exacerbates inequalities between urban communities with market
dominance and rural communities without market dominance.59

III.

THE LOCAL OPTION SALES TAX LANDSCAPE IN WASHINGTON
STATE

The State of Washington has never levied an income tax and has
therefore historically always been funded through property and sales taxes,
thus severely altering the state’s portfolio flexibility. The tax system in the
State of Washington is in fact the most regressive in the nation, as it relies
most heavily on sales taxes.60 The State of Washington is also the first and
only jurisdiction in the United States that ties one or more SPLOST not to
education or transportation, but to public safety.
Under RCW 82.14, the state offers counties and cities three optional
sales tax surcharges earmarked for public safety.61 The first option permits
any county to impose, without vote but subject to repeal by referendum, a
0.1% SPLOST earmarked to fund criminal justice, broadly defined as
“activities that substantially assist the criminal justice system, which may
include circumstances where ancillary benefit to the civil justice system
occurs, and which includes domestic violence services such as those
provided by domestic violence programs, community advocates, and legal
advocate….”62 Once collected, 10% of the tax remains in the county coffers
and 90% is shared among the county and the cities within the county ratably
based on population.
The second option is more complicated as it offers a “county option”
and a “city option.” The county option allows any county to impose, subject
to a majority approval of county voters, up to a 0.3% SPLOST, one third of
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Wang & Zhao, supra note 54.
Peevely & Ray, supra note 51; Rubenstein & Freeman, supra note 40;
Sielke, supra note 51; Green, supra note 38.
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Real Change: Study: Washington Bottoms Out on US Tax Assessment, INST.
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Alternatives for Washington State, WASH. STATE DEP’T REV. (Nov. 2002),
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which must be used to fund either criminal justice or fire protection.63 Once
collected, 40% of the tax remains in the county coffers and 60% is shared
among the county and the cities within the county ratably based on
population. The city option allows any city, independently of counties, to
impose, subject to a majority approval of county voters, a 0.1% SPLOST,
one third of which must be used to fund criminal justice programs.64 Once
collected, 85% of the tax remains in the city coffers and 15% is distributed
to the county.
The third option permits counties with populations of less than one
million to impose, subject to a majority approval of county voters, a 0.1%
SPLOST earmarked to fund “costs associated with financing, design,
acquisition, construction, equipping, operating, maintaining, remodeling,
repairing, reequipping, and improvement of juvenile detention facilities and
jails.”65 Once collected, this tax remains entirely in the county coffers and is
not shared with the cities within the county.
State-issued literature typically refers to the three above-mentioned
SPLOSTs as criminal justice (first option), public safety (second option), and
juvenile facilities (third option) SPLOST.
Option
1
Authority
RCW 82.14.340
Commonly Referred to as Criminal Justice SPLOST
Authorized Jurisdictions All Counties, no vote,
subject only to repeal by
Rate of Tax
0.10%
Portion Earmarked for Criminal Programs
100.00%
Revenue sharing? 10% county; 90% county and
cities based on population
Earmarked Funds may be used for Activities that substantially
assist the criminal justice
system, which may include
circumstances where
ancillary benefit to the civil
justice system occurs, and
which includes domestic
violence services such as
those provided by domestic
violence programs,
community advocates, and
legal advocate

2 (County Option)
RCW 82.14.450(1)
Public Safety SPLOST
All Counties, subject to
majority vote
0.30%
33.33%
60% county; 40% county and
cities based on population
Criminal justice (same as
RCW 82.14.340) and/or fire
protection.

2 (City Option)
RCW 82.14.450(2)
Public Safety SPLOST
All Cities, subject to
majority vote
0.10%
33.33%
85% city; 15% county

3
RCW 82.14.350
Juvenile Facilities SPLOST
Counties with populations
of <1M, subject to majority
0.10%
100.00%
No

Criminal justice (same as Costs associated with
RCW 82.14.340) and/or fire financing, design,
protection.
acquisition, construction,
equipping, operating,
maintaining, remodeling,
repairing, reequipping, and
improvement of juvenile
detention facilities and jails

As of 2018, only Asotin, Garfield, Klickitat, and Wahkiakum
counties have not adopted any of the three SPLOST options. Only Benton,
Franklin, Kittitas, San Juan, Spokane, Walla Walla, and Whatcom counties
63

§ 82.14.450(1).
§ 82.14.450(2).
65
§ 82.14.350.
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have adopted all three SPLOST options. All other counties have adopted one
or two SPLOST options, but not all three.

County-level SPLOST Rates under RCW 82.14.340,
350, and 450
Whatcom
Okanogan

Skagit
Clallam

Chelan
Lincoln

King
Kittitas

Pierce
Lewis

Grant

Adams

Yakima
Klickitat

Powered by Bing
© GeoNames

Combined SPLOST
0.0%

0.5%

Source: Washington State Department of Revenue.66
As informed by criminological and tax literature, the Washington
SPLOST model is expected to exacerbate inequalities across Washington
counties. If tax revenue is flowing unevenly across the State because of the
urbanization trend and a portion of that tax revenue is earmarked for public
safety, some counties are expected to be financially better able to guarantee
public safety than others.
This study tabulated data pertaining to all 39 Washington counties
based on their market dominance and crime levels. For purposes of this study,
counties that collected more than 1.25 times the state-wide average of sales
tax per capita from 2014 to 2017 are labeled Market Dominant (MD).
Counties are labeled High Need (HN) if they meet at least one of the
following two criteria based on 2016 crime statistics: (a) a total crime rate
equal to, or higher than, 1.25 times the state-wide average; or (b) a violent
crime rate equal to, or higher than, 1.25 times the state-wide average. Maps
showing which Washington counties are considered MD and HN based on
the above criteria are below.
66

Tax Rate Lookup, WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
https://webgis.dor.wa.gov/taxratelookup/SalesTax.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2020).
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Market Dominant (MD) Counties
NO
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Source: Washington State Department of Revenue.67

High Need (HN) Counties
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Source: Washington Criminal Justice Databook.68
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https://data.wa.gov/Public-Safety/Criminal-Justice-Data-Book/ixek-wnci/data (last
visited Sept. 8, 2020).
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As the sales tax revenue base is mobile, blue market dominant
counties may stand a better chance to collect more SPLOST tax revenue,
whereas red HN counties may have the highest need for that SPLOST tax
revenue. Overlaying the two maps, there is reason to suspect that local sales
tax revenue earmarked towards public safety is not flowing where it’s most
needed, exacerbating inequalities between market dominant counties (King,
Chelan, Douglas, Kittitas, and Columbia) and other counties. In fact, only
two counties in the entire state (San Juan and Skagit) fit both HN and MD
definitions.

Market Dominant / High Need Counties
Whatcom

HN
Okanogan

Skagit

Neither

Snohomish

Clallam

MD
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King
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Source: Washington State Department of Revenue; Washington
Criminal Justice Databook.69
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